Friday, 24 July 2015

Amazon through the growth prism

Markets often distinguish growth from value, but for an equity, growth defines value. For most stocks, this can be seen by the close relationship between the organic revenue growth being delivered by a company and the implied growth rating being discounted by the share's operating FCF yield. A problem however arises when trying to price in an above market growth rate in perpetuity or worse, a growth rate higher than the cost of equity. Markets understand the impossibility of sustaining both scenarios so will inevitably reach out to some sort of horizon point where the valuation will revert back to discount a market average, or below, rate of growth. The question for investors therefore is whether there is a systematic relationship between this mean reversion point and a group's trading performance over a realistic forecasting horizon.

The encouraging news for the investor is that markets do seem to behave rationally in the way they reach out to a valuation horizon and in a way that can also be incorporated into a predictive tool. Markets value stocks on a near term horizon of <18 months unless organic revenue growth exceeds double the market average, from which point the horizon point is progressively extended in direct relationship to relative organic revenue growth. Instead of scratching your head over whether a PE ratio of 150x or 200x is cheap or dear, view your 'super-growther' from a growth prism and one can start to see how markets have really been discounting their growth prospects. This can only be seen at www.growthrater.com and is included in our valuation algorithms.
An example can be seen with Amazon.com and a chart that is available for registered users at:
https://www.growthrater.com/growthrater/#/horizons
 The chart looks at the mean reversion profile of how far out the markets are reaching in their valuation horizons to bring the company's growth rating back to a market average. The orange line is the company's organic revenue growth rate with the green bars being the number of months that the markets are effectively reaching out to revert the growth rating to a market average. A correlation and Rsq is also included in the chart on these two series - currently approx 0.75/0.56 on the period selected, which is not too shabby. The blue bars denote the forward reach that is calculated automatically within my valuation algorithm. As you can see, I have a max horizon of 50 months as a cut-off which is less gung ho than obviously the market at present is reaching out by, although I have been through too many bubbles to be comfortable in pushing the envelope.


Mean reversion horozon is determined by relative rate of organic revenue growth
Mean reversion horozon is determined by relative rate of organic revenue growth

Monday, 20 July 2015

Google – markets chasing stories arrive late to the party

Markets love a good story. They’re so much easier to digest than actual analysis and usually provide a catalyst for action that brokers and journalists need to stimulate a transaction. Take for example Google’s Q2 results last Thursday. The results themselves were solid, but were neither significantly ahead of street estimates nor provided anything particularly new of note to harden forward expectations. Revenues excl TAC at $14.35bn (+13.3% YoY; c.+20% at =fx) were a touch over the street estimates of $14.27bn as were the funny money non-GAAP EPS of $6.99 vs street estimates of $6.70, which were struck after a -160bps drop in tax rate and excluded a +28% YoY increase in stock compensation charges. The stock however rallied 16.3% on the announcement to close at $699.6 after “soaring” as high as $703.

The issue that was getting markets and commentators so excited about, was the new CFO from Morgan Stanley, Ruth Porat who had arrived in May. “New Google CFO promises more discipline” proclaimed the headline in the FT the next morning, which was the theme taken up by many other commentators. As with Amazon, Google shareholders have had to accept that the founding and controlling shareholders may fritter away margins on occasionally hair-brained blue sky projects and not to expect much in the way of disclosure on costs in a business that is presented as little more than a block box; somewhat ironic for the world’s largest commercial information group. Markets know that a flick of a pen could substantially increase reported margins and the near term earnings performance, so this is an easy narrative to sell, particularly as this is attached to a new personality onto which investors can place their trust. The slight problem with this however, is that the story is running way ahead of the reality. The reality is that all this is mainly a presentational issue to manage investor sentiment and insulate Sergei and Larry from us hoi polloi. After last year’s 2:1 split and issue of non-voting ‘C’ class shares, the founders have effectively locked in their continued voting control of Google and a CFO or any other executive will need to jump to their tune. Ms Porat has managed to successfully present a more market friendly face, but very little has actually changed; a case of form over substance. No new metrics have been disclosed or financial projections of targets were offered. Indeed, the central investment meme of 70-20-10 (70% on core, 20 on adjacent areas and 10 on big new ideas) is unchanged with Ms Porat informing markets that the phasing of the spend on ‘big new ideas’ can be lumpy due to the very nature of these types of opportunities; ie don’t misinterpret a margin spike on a lower spend as this may be temporary. At the end of the day, investors are still largely disenfranchised spectators at the Sergei & Larry show and are along for the ride. A new CFO with good street credentials is a bonus and one might hope would provide valuable advice on managing expectations and returns for markets, but ultimately shareholders are buying into the founders continued vision and ability to pick and back winners. The Q2 numbers out last week were by no means shabby, with organic revenue growth at about +18% (nearer +20% excl TAC), paid clicks up +18% and an aggregate cost per click, although reported down -11%, may have been nearer -4% adjusting for the -7ppts fx headwind in the period. The near +20% organic growth in gross margins however translated into a mere +50bps advance in operating margins, which again highlights that this group remains as opaque as ever.

If markets are chasing a possible momentum story, our valuation position remains embedded in the group’s operating FCF and capacity for growth, with the bounce in the shares taking them from the lower end of our NPV range to the upper range. This is delineated by a normalised growth rating range of +4.0-5.5% on an 18 months forward reach (to Jan 2017) to the valuation horizon which is determined by the pace of organic revenue growth delivery.

Bounce takes Google from lower to upper end of the Growth Rater NPV range
Bounce takes Google from lower to upper end of the Growth Rater NPV range
Incorporating a growth sensitive component in the Growth Rater algorithm can offer greater insight into the share price drivers for the stock. A management story can provide the headlines, but it is only when one looks at the relationship between organic top line growth and the growth rating. A good example of this was from about 2012, when the stock was looking cheap on the Growth Rater model, but was still unloved by markets. The reason for this disparity is easy to identify when one looks at our mean reversion analysis on the ‘Horizons’ tab. While markets were de-rating Google due to its increased investment activity, the growth rater’s sensitivity to organic revenue growth was more than compensating for this. As a consequence, those using the Growth Rater model would have been well ahead of all the tail end Charlie’s now piling into the stock at the top!

Growth Rater identified that the big buy opportunity on Google was from 2012
Growth Rater identified that the big buy opportunity on Google was from 2012

Monday, 13 July 2015

Get the oil price right and make the right call on oil stocks

Invest in an oil major such as Exxon or Chevron and there are two over-riding factors to consider. The first and probably obvious one for Groups which traditionally make over three quarters of their income from pumping oil and gas out of the ground is the price of oil. While an occasional oil spill and >$40bn of fines and penalties can occasionally introduce an extraneous component to the investment equation, the price of oil still provides the principal determinant to company value added. A high correlation of these companies share prices to the price of oil therefore ought not to come as a particular surprise, with the ratio for groups such as Exxon and Chevron exceeding 0.86, with an Rsq of >0.73. In other words, get the oil price right and you’re 9/10ths on the way to getting your investment position on these stocks right.

 Share price to Oil price correlations
Get the oil price right and you're 9/10ths on the way to getting the stock right
Get the oil price right and you're 9/10ths on the way to getting the stock right
The dilemna for investors however is the second investment factor; the apalling inaccuracy of markets in predicting the price of oil even 12 months out which makes sector valuations a volatile play on an uncertain premise. The respected US Energy Information Administration (EIA) for instance has revised its 2015 average Brent price down by 43%/-45/b (from $105/b to $60/b) in the 12 months between its July 2014 and July 2015 “Short-Term Energy Outlook” reports and many bank forecasts have proved even more wildly inaccurate. Indeed, with the forecast revision exceeding the original estimated maximum lower range (+/-$30/b) on last year’s guesstimates, the EIA has increased the absolute margin of error on its forward guidance for oil prices over the next 12 months to nearer +/-$40/b, which on a lower central price estimate (of $67/b for 2016) actually represents an even higher percentage margin of error of almost +/-60%; and this on a 95% confidence interval!

Margin of error is at 60% +/- the projected price forecast!
Margin of error is at 60% +/- the projected price forecast!

What becomes painfully obvious from these projections, along with those of preceding years, is that forward estimates will be dressed up with voluminous analysis of estimated production and demand, but still looks suspiciously like a tangent drawn from the last few data points on the chart. A projected oil price is needed, but the historic record of forecasting suggests investors will need to adapt to directional changes in price forecasts and central to this are sensitivity tools, such as those to be found at www.growthrater.com where one can model the valuation impact of changes in marginal revenues.

Our central modelling assumptions for Brent oil include what is probably a broadly market consensus one in that the price could recover to around $90/b by 2020. In the short term however, the bounce in price after the initial collapse to nearly $40/b may start to wilt in the face of record output from Iraq, potential Iranian supply and continued output from Saudi and of course fracking supply and we are happy to sit on a sub-consensus short term price estimate.

Recovery maybe, but still scope for short-term reversal
Recovery maybe, but still scope for short-term reversal

Modelling these assumptions through our growthrater matrix and the target NPV on most of the oil majors start to recover ahead of current share prices by 2016, and in some cases considerably so into 2017 and 2018, as can be seen from the Royal Dutch Shell analysis below. To get to these future highlands however, markets may need still to negotiate tough terrain where a possible reversal in oil prices will challenge the current consensus expectations.

Royal Dutch Shell example
NPV upside from 2016 on central oil price assumption
NPV upside from 2016 on central oil price assumption
Modelling a Brent price stuck at around $55-60/b for the next three years would equate to lopping around -10% pa from our revenue forecasts in our revenue sensitivity model. As one can see from the below example, the result would not be pretty and therefore suggests that with little confidence in the longer term oil price forecasts dished up by banks and ‘experts’, one should take care not to try and catch this knife too early.

Eliminate oil price recovery with a -10% pa cut in marginal revenues and no share price recovery
Impact of flat oil price at $60/b (=-10% pa impact to central revenue assumption)
Impact of flat oil price at $60/b (=-10% pa impact to central revenue assumption)

More on this and much more can be found at www.growthrater.com

Saturday, 11 July 2015

Tsipras makes Merkel an offer she can't refuse

How should we interpret this week’s volte-face by Tsipras and the Syriza government in approving austerity concessions to the Troika that had been specifically rejected by Greek voters in a referendum less than a week before? Short term, this would seem to provide an opportunity for celebration for creditors and financial markets in that the Greeks will have to repay all their debts and perhaps more importantly will not offer a precedent to other indebted nations to demand debt relief and therefore open the floodgates to unlimited QE and debt monetisation so feared by the northern block.

This reprieve however would be both temporary and illusory as it fails to address the political or economic reality of the situation. The most obvious of these is that Greece is bust and chasing it into the grave for the last sou will make it less, rather than more likely to be able to pay what it owes, let alone become a functioning and contributing member of the EU. Politically, it is also counter-productive for the EU to be shown as a rapacious creditor in league with a politicised and conflicted ECB to use weapons of mass financial destruction to terrorise the Greeks into submission. Without a debt relief, how long do you think Tsipras and his Syriza party will last and if not them who – Golden Dawn or some other extreme fringe, and then what?

At face value, the concessions approved last night by the Greek legislature is at best another attempt to kick the can down the road. While agreeing to cut government expenditures, including pensions and defence along with improving tax collection rates are fairly uncontentious, the current plans also include a number of counter-productive proposals including heavy increases in consumption taxes (eg 23% VAT on restaurants and increased ‘luxury’ taxes on recreational boats on anything longer than a dinghy) as well as increases in corporate and tonnage taxes along with the removal of Island tax breaks. How this is expected to get more tourists to want to go on holiday to Greece or more ships to locate there is a mystery to me and seems to be blind to the simple fact that these industries are mobile and will just go elsewhere and thus further compound the revenue erosion. Does anyone in their right mind actually believe the current commitment to stick to a primary surplus target of 1% for this year rising to over 3% from 2017 is achievable? Look at some of the other proposals and things get even more ominous. Consider the proposed amendments on insolvency laws to get debtors to pay up loans or ‘consultants’ on how to deal with bad loans or the opening up of restricted professions such as court bailiffs. Throw in the asset privatisations of the electricity grid company, regional airports and shipping ports and the Greeks will be little more than rayahs in their own land. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRBPS3o_IvU . Germany may be obsessed with its hyper-inflation history, but it seems to have also forgotten the dangers of leaving a nation without hope or self-respect.

The problem with the above scenario however, is that it doesn’t explain why Tsipras would commit political suicide agreeing to concessions that would not work anyway. It also fails to recognise the wider geopolitical issues at stake which need Greece to stay in the western sphere of influence and would happily sacrifice Germany’s aversion to sovereign debt monetisation to achieve it. Greece has long existed on a number of fault lines (geological, ethnic, cultural, political and religious) and this has been reflected in its complex politics. Add in gas politics of Gazprom cancelling South Stream in favour or a new route through Turkey and Greece and the EU’s domestic spat over debt relief has acquired a more serious geo-political dimension. Tsipras has obviously been playing this card with his meeting with fellow orthodox Putin and the US are concerned enough to put pressure on Europe.


The US therefore needs a deal to keep Greece inside the tent, but knows that Germany is resistant to debt monetisation. As befitting the EU and in the best tradition of the Godfather, they need an ally on the inside that can propose the deal to both parties while furthering its own interests http://youtu.be/fuWkcKbBQkg and this is where the French come in. At the last moment, the French have sponsored the Tsipras’s apparently generous concessions which will form the basis of discussions at tomorrow’s broader EU meetings. Debt relief is not explicitly included, but the IMF ‘leak’ that Greece debt is unsustainable and needs restructuring (ie relief) was incidentally released and not accidently. Tsipras must know that his concessions in isolation would destroy Syriza and resolve nothing, so his participation must therefore have included broader assurances also on debt relief. Germany no doubt suspects that its red line on sovereign debt monetisation may be assassinated at this meeting arranged by its ally and hence some of the rumoured hostility to the plan even though at face value Tsipra has conceded on virtually everything barring a tribute of children. In many ways, Merkel is being manoeuvred into an impossible position. Reject IMF evidence of the need for debt relief and drive Greece into default and her dream of European unity starts to look pretty shabby. Agree to it however, and a principal will have been conceded which will inevitably turn the Eurozone into a transfer union, but without political responsibility or restraint which may hasten calls for a northern block.

Monday, 6 July 2015

Greek referendum - all part of the Varoufakis game

Greece votes a resounding 61% “No” to the Troika debt proposals, yet financial markets remain largely unfazed, with European equity markets declining initially by less than 2% and 10 year bond yields for Italy, Spain and Portugal harden by less than 10bps. With traders having been weaned on a succession of last minute resolutions to avert a crisis (US sub-prime, US debt caps, PIIG’s, to name a few) markets seem to be clutching at the conciliatory comments by Alexis Tsipras and resignation of Yanis Varoufakis together with Angela Merkel’s comments that the Greeks’ decision must “be respected”, whatever that is supposed to mean. But is this a move towards conciliation that is being assumed by markets or an attempt by wily politicians to distance themselves from the impending train-wreck? Should one follow the market conditioning of the past five years and ‘buy the dip’ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0akBdQa55b4) or take note of that the economists at both JP Morgan and Barclays working models now assumes ‘Grexit’?

It is looking increasingly obvious that the Troika negotiations have been set up to fail. Greece is bust and has been for years. EU bureaucrats want to hide it, but Tsipras knows this, so does Merkel, the IMF and even my mother. Another so called bailout that merely adds more debt to pay the interest back to the bankers on the last lot and keep the Greek people in debt bondage for another two generations is now no longer a politically viable option. The terms of that last bailout, which saw over 90% of the €240bn package go back to financial institutions rather than the Greeks, has done the Troika no favours in selling its latest ‘deal’. Politically, Merkel cannot concede the principal of debt forgiveness to Greece given the long line of other EU petitioners who will demand the same, particularly now that the ECB has ECJ clearance for QE. Tsipras however can demand now less given his original election mandate and now the referendum. The referendum was less about giving him better legitimacy to negotiate a better deal from Merkel, but a mandate to reject the Troika. Up until a couple of weeks ago, markets were expecting Tsipras to submit to theTroika’s proposals notwithstanding his election mandate. Now, the mandate is explicit in that he is unable to concede. Burning ones ships to ensure no turning back, may not have been an Athenian tactic, but they seem to have learnt from Cortes. With suitable goading from his finance minister and game theoretician, Yanis Varoufakis, the Troika have adopted a hard line in negotiations and a proposal that Tsipras could take back to Athens to get squashed, but from which it will be nigh impossible for either side to substantively retreat from. Varoufakis’s resignation at his moment of victory therefore is not about securing concessions that cannot be made, but to remove himself as factor from the inevitable collapse in negotiations. This has been set up not just to fail, but to leave the Troika taking most of the responsibility for it.

Over the next few days, markets will urge investors to buy the dip, but may have a rude awakening. Some ‘leading’ investment houses were even recommending investors rotate into financials last week and ahead of the referendum, no doubt hoping for a ‘Yes’ vote and citing that the ECB has now relieved most of the banks of their direct Greek bond exposure, although not the unknown derivative tail risk. We are not aware of whether their recommendation has now been revised following the result or whether they are compounding the error by attempting to brazen out the newsflow with hopes that a last minute debt resolution. Either way, these remain dangerous waters to be exposed to financials, particularly amongst the EU peripherals. The first test meanwhile may come as early as next week when a small Japanese (Samurai) bond of approx Yen 20bn matures. Will this be the first credit event and domino?